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Abstract
Background: Learning about the impact of public health policy presents significant challenges for
evaluators. These include the nebulous and organic nature of interventions ensuing from policy
directives, the tension between long-term goals and short-term interventions, the appropriateness
of establishing control groups, and the problems of providing an economic perspective. An example
of contemporary policy that has recently been subject to evaluation is the first phase of the
innovative Scottish strategy for suicide prevention (Choose Life).
Discussion and summary: This paper discusses how challenges, such as those above, were made
manifest within this programme. After a brief summary of the overarching approach taken to
evaluating the first phase of Choose Life, this paper then offers a set of recommendations for
policymakers and evaluators on how learning from a second phase might be augmented. These
recommendations are likely to have general resonance across a range of policy evaluations as they
move from early planning and implementation to more mature phases.
Background
In recent years two interrelated sets of arguments about
the evaluation of public health policy have become com-
monplace. The first laments the lack of a robust evidence
base for developing policy, and charges evaluators to do
better in producing such knowledge. This, it is argued,
should be brought about by the more frequent applica-
tion of gold-standard approaches to complex interven-
tions [1,2] and through adopting 'a more integrated
approach to evaluation and implementation, using the
most robust and sound methodologies, and taking advan-
tage of "natural experiments"' (p.40) [3]. This is a view
endorsed by the 2004 Wanless report on improving pop-
ulation health [4].
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need to be more explicit about the kinds of knowledge
that they want to generate from the study of such pro-
grammes, and the place of this evidence in subsequent
policymaking [5-9].
In this paper, within the context of these debates, we
exemplify the challenges inherent in evaluating Choose
Life: The National Strategy and Action Plan to Prevent Suicide
in Scotland. We then briefly summarise the overarching
approach taken to evaluating the first phase of Choose Life.
Finally, we set out recommendations for framing subse-
quent evaluation of the initiative as it enters its more
mature second phase. These recommendations have
implications for policymakers and evaluators within pub-
lic health and in wider policy domains.
Choose Life was launched in 2002 as a major strand within
the National Programme for Improving Mental Health
and Well-being in Scotland [10]. As with much contem-
porary policy emanating from the Scottish Executive, the
National Programme was charged with tackling health
inequalities within a wider health improvement agenda
[11]. The overall aim of Choose Life was to reduce suicide
by 20% over a ten year period through the achievement of
objectives such as improved early prevention and crisis
response, engagement with the media and, adoption of an
evidence-based approach. More detail on the guiding
principles of Choose Life and its objectives and priority
groups is presented in table 1 below.
The Choose Life plan was to be implemented in two phases
from 2003–2013. In phase one (2003–2006) £9 m was
allocated to local partnerships across each local authority
area in Scotland, to be used for suicide prevention work,
whilst £3 m was set aside for national activities in support
of the plan. Local areas were, in addition, positively
encouraged to generate additional resources for Choose
Life activities. A further £8.4 m was set aside for the first
two years of the second phase (2006–2008). A more
detailed description of the structure of the initiative is pro-
vided by Platt and colleagues [12].
An intention to evaluate phase one of Choose Life was sig-
nalled in the national strategy and action plan [10] and,
following a competitive tendering process, a consortium
of researchers at the Universities of Edinburgh and Glas-
gow, the London School of Economics and the Scottish
Development Centre for Mental Health was awarded a
two year contract commencing in mid-2004.
Discussion
A recent comparative review of suicide prevention strate-
gies across the globe, carried out as part of the commis-
Table 1: Choose Life: Principles, Objectives and Priority Groups
Guiding principles
• Shared responsibility (across Scottish Executive departments, sectors, agencies and organisational boundaries)
• Effective leadership (nationally and locally
• Taking a person-centred approach (recognising variation in individuals' experiences, often associated with key life stages)
• Focus on priority approach (without losing sight of the broader needs of society as a whole)
• Continuous quality improvement (drawing on, and developing, better information and evidence of what works)
Main objectives
• Early prevention and intervention
• Responding to immediate crisis
• Longer-term work to provide hope and support recovery
• Coping with suicidal behaviour and completed suicide
• Promoting greater public awareness and encouraging people to seek help early
• Supporting the media
• Knowing what works
Priority groups
• Children (especially looked after children)
• Young people (especially young men)
• People with mental health problems (particularly service users and people with severe mental illness)
• People who attempt suicide
• People affected by the aftermath of suicidal behaviour
• People who abuse substances
• People in prison
• People who are recently bereaved
• People who have recently lost employment or who have been unemployed for a period of time
• People in isolated or rural communities
• People who are homelessPage 2 of 8
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majority of government-funded efforts to generate learn-
ing about effective approaches have focused on evaluating
specific interventions rather than on national strategies
per se [12]. For example, Mann and colleagues, in their
review of suicide prevention strategies, look at the impact
of individual components of strategies rather than at the
effect of an overall programme of activity [13]. Whilst
Australia commissioned a summative evaluation of its
national youth suicide prevention strategy, Scotland was
unique in its investment in a national level formative eval-
uation although other countries are now following suit.
Although this provided a welcome opportunity to learn
how whole systems create the context for effective suicide
prevention strategies, it raised an array of challenges for
would-be evaluators.
In this section we consider four specific issues that needed
to be addressed in the evaluation of the first phase of
Choose Life: how to learn from a complex initiative with
multiple stakeholders and outcomes; understanding secu-
lar trends in reaching evaluative judgements (effective-
ness); attempting to provide an economic perspective on
the worth of a national programme (cost-effectiveness);
and integrating data arising from a range of methodolog-
ical approaches. This list, while not exhaustive, repre-
sented the most significant challenges for the evaluation
team.
The nature of complexity in policy initiatives
Current approaches to making and implementing policy
add to programme complexity in a number of ways. Here
we briefly outline seven elements of this complexity and
illustrate in Table 2 below the ways in which these were
made manifest in Choose Life.
First, there is a growing recognition that there has been an
expansion in the number and types of roles that evalua-
tors are expected to play [14-16]. In particular, policy eval-
uators are now expected to provide developmental
Table 2: Challenges of Complexity
Nature of the challenge Its manifestation in Choose Life
i. The multiple purposes that 
evaluation is anticipated to serve
The national evaluation team had objectives in relation to: monitoring progress towards implementation of 
programme milestones; examining the extent to which effective practice was being generated; assessing the 
development of sustainable infrastructure; providing summative as well as formative feedback.
ii. Multiple outcomes of the 
programme
The programme had seven multi-faceted objectives. These were: 
1) Early prevention and intervention: providing earlier intervention and support to prevent problems and 
reduce the risks that might lead to suicidal behaviour;
2) Responding to immediate crisis: providing support and services to people at risk and people in crisis, to 
provide an immediate crisis response and to help reduce the severity of any immediate problem;
3) Longer-term work to provide hope and support recovery: providing on-going support and services to 
enable people to recover and deal with the issues that may be contributing to their suicidal behaviour;
4) Coping with suicidal behaviour and completed suicide: providing effective support to those who are 
affected by suicidal behaviour or a completed suicide;
5) Promoting greater public awareness and encouraging people to seek help early: ensuring greater public 
awareness of positive mental health and well-being, suicidal behaviour, potential problems and risks amongst 
all age groups, and encouraging people to seek help early;
6) Supporting the media: ensuring that any depiction or reporting by any section of the media of a completed 
suicide or suicidal behaviour is undertaken sensitively and appropriately and with due respect for 
confidentiality; and,
7) Knowing what works: improving the quality, collection and availability of information on issues relating to 
suicide and suicidal behaviour and on effective interventions to ensure the better design and implementation 
of responses and services and use of resources.
iii. Horizontal complexity The local authority areas received their funding through the Community Planning Partnership mechanism. 
These statutory planning groups had representation from across public sector organisations (such as the 
NHS, local government and education) and the voluntary sector. The national level also required partnerships 
to be made and sustained between a wide range of organisations.
iv. Vertical complexity Impacts were anticipated among individuals at risk, their families, the organisations with which they engage, 
and at a structural level.
v. The lack of opportunity to 
establish control/comparison 
groups
All local authority areas in Scotland were provided with funding to take forward Choose Life. It was not 
possible, therefore, to identify areas within the country that could act as 'controls'.
vi. Context as integral to a 
programme intervention
Local areas were given flexibility in how they organised the local manifestations of Choose Life. For example, 
they were able to identify their own local priority groups in addition to those identified by the Scottish 
Executive, determine how their funding would be utilised, and develop their own management arrangements 
for the programme of work undertaken.
vii. Long-term goals To reduce the rate of suicide in Scotland by 20% by 2013Page 3 of 8
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impact, and to provide formative as well as summative
feedback. Whilst the evaluation of the first phase of Choose
Life was explicitly focused on the process of implementa-
tion, there were, nonetheless, requests from funders for
the evaluation team to answer questions of effectiveness.
Negotiating, and remaining focused on, the purpose of an
evaluation is, therefore, a key challenge; such purpose
will, in addition, change as the evaluation moves from a
developmental to a theory-testing stage.
Second, national programmes involving a wide range of
stakeholders inevitably involve multiple outcomes [17].
Choose Life is a useful example of this. Although the
national strategy set itself one long-term target (to reduce
the suicide rate in Scotland by 20% between 2002 and
2013), the local areas were given seven key objectives and
were expected to meet 12 milestones (progress towards
these measures is detailed by Platt and colleagues [12].
Multiple outcomes do not simply muddy the waters for
evaluators through increasing the range of data to be col-
lected. A feature of complex initiatives is that there is a
general lack of clarity about when change across and
between outcomes is anticipated because of the unknown
synergies that may occur [18]. The evaluator, therefore,
can struggle to identify the most appropriate point at
which to look for outcomes and the order in which they
will appear. Furthermore stakeholders' outcomes can be
incompatible and disagreements can occur regarding the
primary focus of an impact assessment.
Third, as described by Connell and Kubisch [17], strategic
approaches to tackling health and social problems exhibit
'horizontal complexity'. This means that a range of differ-
ent organisations, often with mismatched agendas, have a
stake in the outcomes (or funding) of an initiative. This
may be particularly problematic where funding is dis-
bursed locally to partnership bodies (Community Plan-
ning Partnerships in the case of Choose Life) whose
member organisations have different approaches to men-
tal health promotion and to how evidence is gathered and
interpreted. In addition, the Choose Life programme man-
ifested horizontal complexity at a national level, with its
National Implementation Support Team charged with
working in partnership with other bodies at a Scotland-
wide level. Once again, experience of evaluating such ini-
tiatives has demonstrated that the evaluator has a tricky
balance to maintain in satisfying the requirements of dif-
ferent stakeholders.
Fourth, complexity is further increased in strategies that
aim to impact on organisations, specific professionals and
practices, communities and individuals ('vertical com-
plexity'). Potential outcomes can start to multiply expo-
nentially [17]. Evaluators cannot and should not measure
everything: they need to develop a purposive strategy for
determining what will be assessed and maintain a focus
on this throughout the course of an evaluation.
Fifth, evaluators who seek to use controlled research
designs to demonstrate that observed changes can be
attributed to the implementation of the programme may
find that complex initiatives are ill-suited to such
approaches. Where programmes are delivered in a small
number of pilot areas, the thrust of policy momentum can
result in programme diffusion to what might have been
regarded as appropriate control sites [7,8]. This is clearly
exacerbated in strategies where no pilot work is under-
taken and an initiative is launched across an entire coun-
try, as with Choose Life. Some commentators have argued
that, with minor design modifications, the practical prob-
lems of carrying out randomised controlled trials can be
overcome [19]. The political realities of strategy develop-
ment and implementation within the UK, however, throw
this into question. A randomised design is also compro-
mised by the lack of comparability of interventions and
their implementation processes between intervention
areas.
A sixth ingredient of complexity is that programmes are
shaped by the contexts in which they are located. The
body of literature emerging from a theory-based approach
to evaluation argues that it is inappropriate and simplistic
to ask whether an intervention works, since an interven-
tion is made up of a myriad of interacting components,
and because some elements will work for particular
groups of individuals in specific contexts and circum-
stances [20-22]. Each of the local areas charged with
implementing Choose Life has its own organisational his-
tory and was given freedom to deliver the programme in
locally determined ways. Understanding context, there-
fore, becomes a more important evaluation task than
ironing it out through a controlled design. Nevertheless,
understanding the contribution made by a programme to
observed change remains a concern for evaluators. We
expand on this in the following section.
Finally, complex health and social programmes are
launched to tackle the most intractable problems. Their
long-term goals, therefore, are ambitious and, more
importantly, lie beyond the timescales of the interven-
tions set up to deliver them and the evaluations designed
to measure them. This challenges evaluators to select
plausible, robust and short-term intermediate or proxy
measures of the more distal intended outcome(s). In the
metaphor of our title, the long term outcome of interest is
the absence of suicide events (the dog that doesn't bark in
the night). Whilst we cannot realistically capture this
within the life of an evaluation, the evaluator's goal is to
ensure that process measures are appropriate proxies forPage 4 of 8
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the measurement of the tail of the dog as a predictor of its
future barking behaviour). In suicide prevention evalua-
tions the quest for appropriate proxies is made difficult by
the deficiencies of the existing evidence base. There
remains a significant leap in the dark, for example, from
the provision of mental health awareness programmes in
secondary school to the prevention of suicide attempts in
the community at some future date. Likewise, there is
debate about the value of proxies such as hospital-treated
self-harm as a marker for later suicide [23].
Secular trends
As discussed above, demonstrating that a programme has
led to a change in outcome is not in itself enough to con-
vince observers that the intervention has played a causal
role. This is true in particular when trends in the outcome
of interest are on a downward slope. For example, the
rates for suicides and undetermined deaths for men in
Scotland rose to a peak in 1992 (34.2/100,000 popula-
tion aged 15+ years), remained at (or just below) this high
level until 2002 (34.1/100,000), after which there has
been a decline to 27.1/100,000 in 2005 (lowest rate since
1991) [12]. The decline since 2002 may be attributable in
part to Choose Life activities. However, the massive reduc-
tion in male suicide and undetermined deaths between
2002 (n = 673, rate = 34.1/100,000) and 2003 (n = 577,
rate = 29.1/100,000) occurred when Choose Life had only
been very partially implemented and is instead probably
due, in large part, to the influence of other factors (e.g. leg-
islation restricting paracetamol sales [23-25]). In the
absence of control data there is, therefore, a significant
challenge in interpreting trends over time.
This is exacerbated by the relative rarity of suicide as an
event. It becomes virtually impossible for evaluators to
propose (dis)confirmable explanations for observed
changes in trends over short time periods (in this instance,
two years) and at a small area level. Teasing out the possi-
ble impact of different strategic approaches within the
umbrella of Choose Life on rates of suicide is equally prob-
lematic. Once again this points to the need for plausible
short-term indicators of progress but without evidence of
strong indicators of suicidal behaviour this remains diffi-
cult.
Undertaking an economic analysis
As debates about scarcity of resources within the NHS
grow, there is a parallel increase in policy interest in
addressing the cost-effectiveness of differing approaches
to health improvement, yet economic evaluations of com-
plex public health interventions remain relatively rare
[26]. Sefton [27] has argued, that bringing health eco-
nomic perspectives from the field of narrowly defined
technology assessment into the domain of complex policy
evaluation raises both practical and epistemological diffi-
culties. First and foremost, approaches to assessing cost-
effectiveness rely on the existence of robust measures of
both costs and benefits. At the level of policy and public
health interventions, however, these types of data are
woefully limited and the problems that beset randomised
controlled trials also undermine the use of standard
health economic techniques [28]. In addition, the eco-
nomic notion of time preference has meant that short
term outcomes, more likely to be seen in health care inter-
ventions, are usually deemed to have greater economic
benefits than health promoting interventions that may
take several years to achieve change. [30,31] Second, par-
adigmatic conflicts between those working in the field of
traditional outcome studies and those dealing with the
complexities of messy policy evaluation can result in ster-
eotypical and blinkered views of the contribution to be
made by different disciplines and research approaches.
For example, McDaid and colleagues argue that, within
the field of suicide prevention, an economist's focus on a
single outcome, such as the rate of suicide or the number
of life years saved, may be viewed as inappropriately
reductionist by those interested in capturing the complex-
ity of synergistic approaches to mental health promotion
[28]. Conversely, a focus on process and organisational
change to the detriment of measurable outcomes may be
viewed by economists as a failure to pursue an interven-
tion's bottom line. As Sefton argues, making these 'ends
meet' requires not only that evaluation teams are multi-
disciplinary in name but also that they practise in an inte-
grative fashion [27].
Integrating findings
Achieving an integrated approach to evaluation is much
less straightforward than it sounds. Accepting the need to
address questions of process and outcome and designing
an evaluation that will seek to gather data which are
appropriate to both can still result in 'silo evaluations',
with the final report summarising results in separate sec-
tions. In their evaluation of the Total Purchasing Pilot in
primary care, Evans and colleagues illustrate this through
their description of how, in the absence of an a priori the-
oretical framework, members of a multidisciplinary team
were left to undertaken their own sub-components of a
multi-method evaluation [32]. Even explicit and pre-emp-
tive attempts to be integrative, such as the use of theory-
based approaches to evaluation, can struggle to combine
data from different sources [7].
Our approach
Although aware of the challenges that have beset policy
evaluations in recent years when we embarked on our
evaluation of the first phase of Choose Life, we neverthe-
less struggled to find satisfactory solutions through our
evaluation approach and practice. Here we summarise thePage 5 of 8
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out within the research brief and the general evaluation
framework that we used.
At its most general level the purpose of the national eval-
uation was to 'assess ... infrastructure and early impacts' of
Choose Life and to 'set the template for the next phase' of
the strategy [10]. Its aims are detailed in table 3 below:
Our overarching evaluation framework derived from The-
ories of Change [20,22]. This approach, designed specifi-
cally for the evaluation of complex, multiple outcome and
multi-partner programmes, aims to study cumulatively
the links between the purposive activities undertaken to
tackle significant social problems, their short-term out-
comes and processes, and longer-term goals. It seeks to
address questions about which components of an overall
programme work for which individuals in which sets of
circumstances. In this regard it is well suited to the evalu-
ation of a national strategy that is expected to operate dif-
ferently in different local contexts, since it aims to capture
why and how local variations occur. It also explicitly rec-
ognises that different stakeholders within an intervention
will have potentially competing expectations of a pro-
gramme and seeks to deal with this by encouraging a col-
laborative approach to agreeing a theory of change and
prioritising key indicators and outcomes for tracking
progress.
Whilst the approach is not without its practical and con-
ceptual difficulties [33-35], it does nonetheless aim to
provide an integrative framework for data generation and
interpretation. For example, using the approach allows
questions of effectiveness and cost-effectiveness to be
embedded in a chain of events linking complex organisa-
tional processes, monitoring data and proxy measures of
programme success. Its main difficulties include its time-
consuming nature, the challenges of eliciting detailed and
well-specified theories from stakeholders, and (of particu-
lar significance in the evaluation of Choose Life) how to
bridge gaps in knowledge between unsatisfactory proxy
measures and the long-term goal of a programme. This
latter problem can be illustrated by comparing a suicide
prevention programme with a strategy to reduce coronary
heart disease: whilst a three year heart disease programme
might be deemed successful if it reduces levels of risk fac-
tors such as obesity or smoking, the links between self-
harm incidence and suicide incidence are less clear-cut.
Nonetheless, a Theories of Change approach has provided
an evaluation framework that allowed researchers from a
range of disciplines to work towards an integrated set of
evaluation questions and helped to direct the team
towards the selection of appropriate methods, including
documentary analysis, interviews, group exercises and sur-
veys [10]. An evaluation database was designed and uti-
lised to store and retrieve data that were analysed
iteratively and thematically. The data generated were, in
addition, put in the context of international approaches to
suicide prevention.
Whilst no separate economic data collection was under-
taken, the research instruments developed for use in the
study were deliberately informed by an economic perspec-
tive. Although imperfect, these allowed the evaluation
team to consider the extent to which Choose Life stimu-
lated additional local investment from their partnership
organisations, including in-kind investments and the con-
tribution of unpaid volunteers, targeted resources at rele-
vant priority groups, spent their funding on proven
effective practice and interventions, and stimulated local
innovation.
In summary our approach aimed to provide a formative
assessment of whether processes and short-term out-
comes at far remove from the distal outcome – reduced
rates of suicide – were being encouraged at a local and
national level. It is not within the remit of this paper to
discuss the findings of the evaluation – these are pre-
sented elsewhere [12], however, through the approach
adopted the team were able to make recommendations
concerning future investments in suicide prevention, sus-
tainability, targeting of efforts, the integration of self-
harm into suicide prevention strategies and the role of
local and national partnerships. To illustrate we provide
some specific examples. First, in relation to targeting local
action we found that the long list of priority groups set by
Choose Life was unhelpful since it led to rank ordering at a
local level, and, in some cases, a lack of focus on local
needs assessment. Second, in terms of sustainability, our
data suggest that, whilst the initiative acted as an unprec-
Table 3: National Evaluation of Choose Life – Main Aims
1. Establish and apply measures to assess whether a sustainable infrastructure is being developed nationally and locally to support the Choose Life 
strategy in achieving its objectives
2. Measure and review progress towards implementation of the 27 milestones identified in the Choose Life strategy and action plan and set findings 
in context, national and internationally
3. Examine whether and how Choose Life is stimulating effective forms of practice (nationally and in individual local areas)
4. On the basis of findings, and in consultation with the Scottish Executive and the Research Advisory Group steering the evaluation, provide 
detailed and staged recommendations to guide the next phase of the action plan to achieve a 20 per cent reduction in suicides in Scotland by 2013, 
and the targeting of any funding available to support the next phasePage 6 of 8
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suicide prevention within the mental health improve-
ment agenda, the local and national contexts made it dif-
ficult to bring together clinical and community
approaches to prevention and treatment. Finally, in terms
of defining the boundaries of Choose Life there was evi-
dence of considerable variation across the programme of
how 'high risk' suicidal behaviour was conceptualised and
tackled. This suggests that nationally greater consideration
needs to be given to how action on self-harm is integrated
within a wider suicide prevention strategy.
Summary
As discussed earlier, learning from the first phase of Choose
Life was expected to feed into its second and more mature
implementation phase. Many commentators who argue
that public health and social care programmes, like med-
ical interventions, should ideally be submitted to testing
through randomised controlled trials acknowledge that
this may be impossible in the early stages of implementa-
tion as national strategies struggle to find their local feet
[36]. Instead they suggest that, once interventions have
matured into stable entities, then they can be evaluated
using gold standard approaches. Notwithstanding the
impossibility of utilising a controlled approach to an
intervention that has already been rolled out nationally,
there are other difficulties with this suggestion. Above all,
it is questionable whether social programmes ever
become stable interventions – more likely they will
strengthen or weaken and constantly evolve as part of a
local and national system for tackling health improve-
ment.
To help generate learning for the future we make the fol-
lowing recommendations that build on those contained
in our final report [12]. First, an integrative framework
such as Theories of Change should continue to shape pur-
posive strategies for generating evidence. Second, work to
determine nationally and locally acceptable proxy meas-
ures of success for phase two should be undertaken and
resulting targets used to stimulate action rather than to
create perverse incentives [37]. Third, continued efforts to
learn about the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of dif-
ferent strategies for intervening to promote mental health,
prevent suicide, and alleviate its effects in different con-
texts should be prioritised – ongoing routine but compa-
rable data collection on the uptake of different individual
interventions and the resource contributions of unpaid
volunteers to their delivery should be an important ele-
ment of this process. Fourth, learning about the impact of
different organisational structures on proxy indicators of
progress should be undertaken through case-study evalu-
ations of contrasting approaches. Fifth, whilst suicide pre-
vention is a unique goal, efforts to capitalise on learning
across policy domains about how to interpret/utilise evi-
dence and mainstream good practice should be maxim-
ised. Finally, measuring trends in suicide rates will remain
an important strand of monitoring progress only insofar
as it is undertaken sensitively, with due cognisance of the
small number of events involved and the distorting effect
of 'natural' year on year fluctuations. With such a strategy
in place, useful learning may emerge about how to impact
positively on mental health and well-being and suicide
prevention at strategic and local, as well as programme
and practice, levels. Only then will we be in the position
to judge whether we have appropriately measured the dog
that doesn't bark in the night.
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